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THE RISE AND FALL OF PATENT LAW UNIFORMITY AND THE
NEED FOR A CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
SCOTT COLE
The Supreme Court's Holmes Group v. Vornado1 decision ensures
that future patent law issues that are litigated, but that do not arise in the
complaint, will be appealed to regional circuit courts, or potentially even
decided in state courts. Commentators argue that such a structure sets pat-
ent law back nearly to the pre-Federal Circuit era and thus reintroduces
patent law to forum shopping and lack of uniformity.2 Absent a congres-
sional response, it is the responsibility of the regional circuit courts to ef-
fectuate congressional intent regarding patent law uniformity in light of the
Holmes decision. However, even a concerted effort on the part of these
courts will be insufficient to fully satisfy the intent of Congress in creating
the Federal Circuit due to the inherent differences in reasonable interpreta-
tion of the same law.
It is therefore necessary for Congress to readdress the scope of Federal
Circuit jurisdiction. The courts cannot simply determine subject matter
jurisdiction based on a bright line rule such as the well-pleaded complaint
rule. The Holmes decision will affect a significant number of cases, most
notably patent counterclaims in response to antitrust and trade dress law-
suits. These cases represent an area of law where the subject matter juris-
diction of the court is invariably intertwined with matters not exclusively
within the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction. From a policy standpoint, it is
necessary to determine whether uniformity in patent law is a sufficient
concern to warrant Federal Circuit jurisdiction in these non-patent areas as
well. There is no dispute that these associated areas of law will benefit
from varying interpretations among the different appellate courts, but to the
extent that they substantially affect the operation of patent law, the need for
uniformity in the field requires exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.
1. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Bass, III & Linda E. Alcorn, Critique and Consequences of the Supreme
Court's Decision in Holmes v. Vomado, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 501, 514-19 (2003). This is likely
overstated to a certain degree, especially at present. The Federal Circuit still hears the vast majority of
patent cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a). As discussed infra, however, the passage of time without a
change in the current application of Federal Circuit jurisdiction may create a lack of uniformity in the
field of patents and approach the pre-Federal Circuit era.
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In 1982, Congress created the Federal Circuit under the Federal Court
Improvement Act of 1982 ("FCIA") for the express purposes of creating
national uniformity in the application of patent law, developing technical
judicial expertise, reducing the burdensome caseload on appellate courts,
and eliminating forum shopping among the federal circuit courts. 3 The
appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, established under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a), grants the power to hear "an appeal from a final decision of a
district court of the United States... if the jurisdiction of that court was
based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title. ' '4 Section 1338(a),
in turn, provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents .... "5
The recent Supreme Court decision in Holmes interpreted this language to
restrict Federal Circuit patent jurisdiction to only those cases in which the
plaintiff raised a patent issue in its well-pleaded complaint.6 However, this
interpretation flies in the face of the clear congressional intent to direct
virtually all patent issues to the Federal Circuit in hopes of creating uni-
formity in this troublesome area of law.
The scope of Federal Circuit jurisdiction has been unclear since the
court's creation.7 Following the inception of the Federal Circuit, confusion
existed in the district courts regarding the interpretation of the "in whole or
in part" and "arising under" text of these statutes. 8 At that time, the Federal
Circuit heard appeals from cases in which a patent law issue arose either in
the plaintiffs complaint or in the defendant's counterclaim. 9 In 1988, the
Supreme Court limited this jurisdiction with its holding in Christianson v.
Colt Industries Operating Corp.1o In Christianson, the Court held that the
"arising under" language of § 1338 must necessarily be interpreted the
same as the identical language in § 1331 dealing with federal question ju-
risdiction." As such, the Federal Circuit jurisdiction depends upon the
"well-pleaded complaint rule," which allows appeals to that court if the
complaint "establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of
3. Fed. Circuit Bar Ass'n Bd. of Governors, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study Holmes
Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 713, 716-22 (2002). See also
H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 23 (1981).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000).
5. Id. § 1338(a).
6. See Holmes Group, Inc., 535 U.S. at 833-34.
7. Christian A. Fox, On Your Mark, Get Set, Go! A New Race to the Courthouse Sponsored by
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vomado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 331, 334 (2003).
8. See id. at 335-36.
9. See, e.g., Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Ltd., 895 F.2d 736 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
10. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
11. Id. at 808-09.
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action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on the reso-
lution of a substantial question of federal patent law."'12
In response to Christianson, the Federal Circuit adopted a liberal in-
terpretation of the well-pleaded complaint rule, apparently relying on its
opinion that "substantial questions" was a flexible standard. 13 The Federal
Circuit's decision in Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works firmly
established its interpretation of the Christianson requirement prior to being
overturned by Holmes.14 In Aerojet, the Federal Circuit unanimously held
that compulsory counterclaims were within the scope of the well-pleaded
complaint rule and therefore subject to its exclusive jurisdiction, although
patent defenses did not qualify a case for Federal Circuit jurisdiction. 15 In
so holding, the court reasoned that "Congress clearly wanted this court to
get its hands on well-pleaded, nonfrivolous claims arising under the patent
laws and thus to maximize the court's chances of achieving the Congres-
sional objectives that formed the basis for the [Federal Court Improvement
Act]."'1 6 This remained good law for the next twelve years until the Su-
preme Court struck Aerojet down in Holmes. 17
The Holmes case arose based on a trade dress infringement complaint
issued to the International Trade Commission by Vornado against
Holmes.' 8 Holmes responded by filing a complaint at the federal district
court seeking a declaratory judgment that no such infringement took
place. 19 Although Vomado, the defendant in the declaratory judgment ac-
tion, asserted a patent infringement counterclaim (presumably to secure
jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit under Aerojet) the counterclaim was
never adjudicated at the district court level.20 Following a decision in favor
of Holmes, Vornado appealed to the Federal Circuit.21 After the Federal
Circuit asserted jurisdiction and remanded the case, Holmes appealed to the
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. In reviewing the scope of the
Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its formalistic
12. Id.
13. Aerojet, 907 F.2d at 741.
14. Id. The Federal Circuit assumed jurisdiction according to the rule established in the Aerojet
decision from the time that it was decided up to and including the Holmes appeal. See Holmes, 535 U.S.
at 829 (identifying petitioners unsuccessful challenge to the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction).
15. Aerojet, 895 F.2d at 741-44.
16. Id. at 744 (emphasis in original). See also Scott Amy, Limiting the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit: How Holmes Alters the Landscape of Patent Cases on Appeal, 38 GA. L. REV. 429,443 (2003).
17. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 830.
18. Id. at 828.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 829.
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reasoning in Christianson that the well-pleaded complaint rule governed its
appellate jurisdiction.22 The Court clarified the prior precedent by asserting
that only those claims in the plaintiffs complaint could satisfy the "arising
under" language of § 1338, regardless of congressional intent.
23
This Comment argues that congressional action is an appropriate re-
sponse to Holmes. Part I demonstrates the necessity of uniformity in patent
law by weighing the benefits and drawbacks of specific legislation de-
signed to protect this area of law. Part II analyzes the effect of the Holmes
decision with respect to those benefits and drawbacks. Part III next consid-
ers possible non-congressional responses to determine whether the uni-
formity of patent law is maintainable by the least burdensome means.
Finally, Part IV of this Comment examines what actions Congress may
take, in light of current common law doctrine, in order to secure the Federal
Circuit jurisdiction necessary to maintain uniformity in the patent field.
I. UNIFORMITY IN PATENT LAW IS NECESSARY FOR EFFECTIVE
PROMOTION OF THE USEFUL ARTS
The necessity and desirability of uniformity in patent law has long
been debated.24 Proponents of uniformity in patent law generally point to
its necessity for effective business planning which leads to greater innova-
tion.25 Opponents of uniformity contend that such a focus in one area of the
law leads to "tunnel vision" in which legitimate disputes may be over-
looked in the honest attempt to achieve the goal.26 Both arguments are
legitimate, and with the passage of the FCIA and the creation of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Congress struck a balance between the
two sides that achieves the benefits desired by proponents while alleviating
the fears of opponents.27
The purpose of patent law is twofold and self-fulfilling. Patent law
seeks to encourage disclosure of new and useful inventions to the public by
22. Id. at 830.
23. Id. at 832-33.
24. See generally H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20 (1981).
25. Id. at 23. In obtaining a patent, a business must determine if the value of a patent will offset
the cost of the time and effort expended in development of the patented technology. If the invention is
not likely to provide a net profit, the business is unlikely to pursue the project. Uniformity of the law
aids businesses in this position by providing them with the ability to accurately assess the patent value.
Without the ability to make this accurate determination, the risks of investment increase and the likeli-
hood of development and innovation must decrease.
26. Comm'n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal Procedures:
Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195,234-35 (1975) [hereinafter Hruska Report].
27. See generally H.R. REP. No. 97-312.
[Vol 81:713
RISE AND FALL OF PATENT LAW UNIFORMITY
offering the incentive of a temporary pseudo-monopoly in the invention.28
The law is designed to benefit the public by encouraging the disclosure of
the previously private information, giving the public alternatives to solu-
tions, which presumably leads to further innovation.29 This innovation is a
foundation of American industry and leads to economic growth and its
attendant public benefits. 30 Uniformity in the law of patents encourages
such innovation because litigation of patents is particularly expensive and
time consuming due to the complexity and technical detail of the subject
matter. 31 Practitioners in the business of innovation recognize that a patent
and the ability to anticipate its value through a uniform application of the
law lead to greater certainty and increase the degree of investment that a
business is willing to make towards commercializing a new invention. 32
Particularly for small businesses, certainty in the law provides the opportu-
nity to invest in innovation while limiting the significant additional risk of
expensive litigation that follows from different interpretations of the same
law by different courts. 33 As noted in the House Report approving the crea-
tion of the Federal Circuit, "[d]ecisions to file patent applications and to
invest in commercializing inventions would be improved meaningfully as a
result of the greater uniformity and reliability. ...
In addition, uniformity in patent law reduces the amount of litiga-
tion.35 This benefits not only patent holders but the public as well by reduc-
ing taxpayer costs of supporting the increased burden on the courts and by
further spurring investment in innovation due to decreased risk; this in-
creases the economic prosperity of the nation. The absence of courts with
varying interpretations gives security to patent holders, allowing them to
invest greater amounts into the development of new innovation without the
fear of recurring litigation on a common theme, which consistent interpre-
tations of the law make financially unrewarding. 36 The House Report
summed up the benefits of uniformity well when it stated that lack of uni-
28. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimen-
tal Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024 (1989).
29. Id. at 1028.
30. Seeid. at 1031.
31. SeeH.R. REP. No. 97-312, at20.
32. Id. at 22 (citing support for the proposition that innovators desire certainty in patent law, the
House Report noted that "the Industrial Research Institute, a private, non-profit corporation with a
membership of approximately 250 industrial companies that account for a major portion of the indus-
trial research and development conducted in the United States, polled its membership and found them
overwhelmingly in favor of centralizing patent appeals in a single court").
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 22-23.
36. Id. at 23.
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formity leads to forum shopping that "not only increases litigation costs
inordinately and decreases one's ability to advise clients, it demeans the
entire judicial process and the patent system as well."
'37
Two bases of opposition are generally asserted against patent law uni-
formity. The first basis of opposition is that development of the law bene-
fits from opposing viewpoints in different courts. 38 The second centers on
the fear that specialized interests may develop in specialized courts, which
can easily lose sight of the big picture and policy concerns affecting those
areas of law not addressed by the court.
39
The existence of opposing viewpoints is concededly beneficial in gen-
eral. However, the law recognizes greater benefits in uniformity with re-
spect to laws that affect financial planning, and hence the national
economy, as evidenced by the development of uniform laws such as the
Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service Tax Code. These sets of laws are all directed to eco-
nomic planning and consequences for both businesses and individuals.
They reflect the policy decision that the need for certainty in economic
planning outweighs the benefit of opposing viewpoints in the law. Like-
wise, the effect and value of patents now constitute a critical element in the
economic planning of many businesses. 40 As in other areas of the law con-
cerning economic planning, policy concerns dictate that the economic
benefits of uniformity in patent law outweigh the detriments of uniformity
in general.
In addition, the desire for opposing viewpoints is necessarily directed
only to variations found in courts inferior to the United States Supreme
Court. Because a Supreme Court ruling on patent law is binding on all infe-
rior courts, the Court's decision, at least theoretically, creates uniformity.
Therefore, the heart of the argument is not ultimately in opposition to uni-
formity in the field, but in vesting the creation of that uniformity in an ap-
pellate level court with binding authority on all lower level courts in that
subject matter. The primary theoretical problem in allowing a single infe-
rior appellate court to create binding precedent is that alternative view-
points cannot then be raised, even at the trial level. However, this problem
is not a valid concern in the field of patent law because, as Congress noted
in passing the FCIA, patent law "is an area in which the application of the
37. Id. at 21.
38. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 839 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
39. See Hruska Report, supra note 26, at 235.
40. H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 22.
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law to the facts of a case often produces different outcomes in different
courtrooms in substantially similar cases. '41 This quirk inevitably intro-
duces viewpoints not previously considered, which the Federal Circuit can
then address.
Forum shopping is also a pressing concern that weighs against allow-
ing patent law diversity.42 Although forum shopping is discouraged regard-
less of the area of law, the House Report prepared prior to the inception of
the Federal Circuit noted that patent law is particularly susceptible to forum
shopping because of the potential for variable outcomes in similar factual
situations. 43 Because the patent laws are so vulnerable to alternative inter-
pretations, the policies of courts in various regions of the country are likely
to diverge, creating "mad and undignified races" to the courthouse, as the
state of affairs prior to centralization of patent law indicates. 44 Opponents
of uniformity argue that forum shopping is beneficial because it demon-
strates ambiguities in the law which different regional factions prefer, re-
quiring review by the Supreme Court.45 According to this argument, it also
prevents a specialized court from implementing an institutional bias.4
6
This line of argument fails with regard to patents on two counts. First,
patent law is a national creation; patents are not subject to the preferences
of regional factions but are developed to promote innovation and spur the
national economy.47 In fact, those opposing a full scope of patent jurisdic-
tion for the Federal Circuit would not likely oppose the same cases being
adjudicated in front of the Supreme Court if time and resources permitted.
A Supreme Court decision, however, would create the same degree of uni-
formity sought by Congress in the creation of the Federal Circuit. Thus, the
opposition to this line of argumentation is not directed at uniformity of
patent law, but at the level of the court at which such uniformity is deter-
mined.
Second, the Federal Circuit is not a specialized court, in the true sense
of the phrase, because of the vast array of subject matter to which it is ex-
posed.48 This reduces the risk of institutional bias that concerns those op-
41. Id. at 20.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 21.
45. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 839 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
46. Id.
47. The federal nature of the patent system is evident from the Constitutional grant of power to
Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8.
48. H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 19 (stating that the Court of Claims, from which the Federal Circuit
was formed, heard cases in a host of specific legal areas).
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posed to specialized courts. The primary fear is that "the quality of deci-
sion-making would suffer as the specialized judges become subject to 'tun-
nel vision,' seeing the cases in a narrow perspective without the insights
stemming from broad exposure to legal problems in a variety of fields." 49
Other concerns regarding specialized courts include the fear that judges, as
experts in a single field, may impose their own policy beyond the scope of
the case, that the system will not incentivize judges to produce thorough
and persuasive opinions, that regional influences may be eliminated, or that
special interest groups may "capture" the judicial seats. 50
These are legitimate concerns with respect to specialized courts. How-
ever, the broad range of subject matter directed to the Federal Circuit ne-
gates these concerns. As opposed to hearing only those cases relating to
patents, the Federal Circuit decides cases involving a broad range of legal
issues including some agency appeals, federal contracts, civil tax issues
involving the government, Indian claims, military and civilian pay disputes,
inverse condemnation, and others.51 This broad range provides judges on
the Federal Circuit a more extensive background in a variety of fields,
which gives the judges perspective in deciding the issues before them. Ad-
ditionally, Federal Circuit cases may be appealed to the Supreme Court,
providing incentive to Federal Circuit judges to furnish complete opinions
relating strictly to the issues of the case.52 Lastly, the alarmist fear that
special interest groups could take over the Federal Circuit is unfounded. No
greater risk of corruption is present in appointment of Federal Circuit
judges than in the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. Federal Circuit
judges and Supreme Court Justices are subject to the same appointment by
the President of the United States and the same review by Congress. 53 Al-
though there are inherent concerns in the establishment of specialized
courts, the broad range of Federal Circuit jurisdiction and the appellate
check of the Supreme Court effectively balance these concerns against the
need for uniformity in patent law.
II. HOLMES AND THE RESULTING DISRUPTION OF UNIFORMITY
IN PATENT LAW
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Christianson and
Holmes effectively eviscerated the intent of Congress in passing the FCIA.
49. See Hruska Report, supra note 26, at 234-35.
50. Id. at 235.
51. H.R. REP.NO. 97-312, at 19.
52. Id. at 41.
53. Id. at 16.
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The Christianson decision eliminated the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit
with respect to patent defenses. 54 Twelve years later, the Supreme Court
again restricted the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit in Holmes, this time
striking down counterclaims that were previously appealed to the Federal
Circuit.55 The result is that cases that are substantially dependent on appli-
cation of patent law, but in which these issues do not arise in the plaintiffs
complaint, will be appealed to the regional circuit courts or even tried in
state level courts. As discussed in Section III below, this will necessarily
lead to a disruption in the uniformity of patent law and a frustration of con-
gressional intent.
The Supreme Court decision in Holmes further inflamed the situation
created by the Christianson decision in two significant respects. First, the
decision promotes forum shopping with respect to issues of patent law.
Second, the decision extends the scope of state jurisdiction over important
matters of federal concern.
Putting a stop to forum shopping was one of the goals that Congress
sought to achieve in passing the FCIA.56 Prior to the creation of the Federal
Circuit, patent cases were adjudicated in the regional circuit courts; these
courts developed reputations as either pro- or anti-patent, leading to "mad
and undignified" races to the courthouse between patent holders and al-
leged infringers in order to determine the forum of the litigation. 57 Com-
mentators both in favor of and opposed to the Holmes decision have argued
over whether the post-Holmes landscape is a return to this "race to the
courthouse. ' '58 Both sides present a strong argument. Those in favor of the
Holmes decision generally concede that a degree of forum shopping will
result from the decision, but that Federal Circuit treatment of non-patent
law has resulted in a form of non-patent forum shopping that outweighs
this concern. 59 For example, the Federal Circuit decision in Nobelpharma
54. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
55. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002).
56. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 22 ("A single court of appeals for patent cases will promote
certainty where it is lacking to a significant degree and will reduce, if not eliminate, the forum-shopping
that now occurs.").
57. Id. at 21.
58. Compare Fox, supra note 7, at 348 (arguing that alleged infringers with a legitimate alterna-
tive claim, such as antitrust, can now preemptively file and force a compulsory patent claim that will
not confer Federal Circuit jurisdiction and allow forum shopping among the regional circuit courts),
with Patrick H. Moran, The Federal and Ninth Circuits Square Off: Refusals to Deal and the Precari-
ous Intersection Between Antitrust and Patent Law, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 387,415 (2003) (arguing that the
result of a race to the courthouse was clear to the Court in issuing the Holmes opinion, but this result is
outweighed by the elimination of forum shopping in favor of Federal Circuit jurisdiction for non-patent
law issues).
59. See Moran, supra note 58, at 415.
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altered the court's treatment of non-patent issues, specifically antitrust
law.60 Prior to that decision, the court relied upon the interpretation of the
regional circuit courts on all antitrust matters of law.61 Post-Nobelpharma,
the policy of the Federal Circuit was to apply its own interpretation to those
non-patent matters. 62 Some commentators rightfully contend that this pol-
icy allows practitioners to forum shop by either adding or omitting patent
claims to obtain or avoid Federal Circuit jurisdiction with respect to a case
based primarily on antitrust law.63 Supporters of Holmes then conclude that
the patent related forum shopping created by diluting Federal Circuit juris-
diction is counterbalanced by the decrease in forum shopping in non-patent
fields.64 However, in enacting the FCIA, Congress specifically contem-
plated the effect that Federal Circuit jurisdiction over patent cases would
have on non-patent areas of law. 65 In light of this consideration, it is logical
to deduce that Congress determined that uniformity of patent law out-
weighed these considerations. In fact, to alleviate these fears, Congress
added a provision to the Act, indicative of the forum shopping that those
questioning the Act had in mind; this provision provided only that Federal
Circuit jurisdiction could not be altered by "immaterial, inferential, and
frivolous allegations. ' 66 Thus, it appears that Congress's concern was not
that the Federal Circuit would decide important issues of non-patent law,
but that parties would manipulate the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit to
take advantage of those interpretations.
Supporters of Holmes also point to the fact that three years have
elapsed since the decision and Congress has not reacted, suggesting that the
importance and magnitude of this decision on patent uniformity is over-
stated.67 One commentator notes that "[t]he reported cases prior to Holmes
which based Federal Circuit jurisdiction on patent law counterclaims total
less than ten."'68 Although the insignificance of the number and the lack of
congressional action are initially persuasive, a thorough consideration re-
veals that a single notion answers both of these concerns.
60. See generally Nobelpharma v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1067-68.
63. See Moran, supra note 58, at 415.
64. Id.
65. S. REp. No. 97-275, at 6 (1981), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16.
66. Id. at 19-20.
67. See, e.g., Moran, supra note 58, at 415.
68. Christopher A. Cotropia, "Arising Under" Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 253, 298 (2003), available at
http://www.mttlr.org/volnine/cotropia.pdf.
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First of all, it takes time for a doctrinal shift to occur. Because the re-
gional circuit courts have not developed case law relating to patents since
1982, it is reasonable that they will rely on Federal Circuit precedent until a
clear body of law is developed within the circuit on that issue.69 Because
they will apply Federal Circuit law, there is no reason for a litigant to fo-
rum shop among the circuits, and therefore the number of cases will be
limited. However, at some point, the regional circuit courts will decide
issues of patent law based upon interpretations of their own precedent.
When this occurs, it will invariably lead to splits between some of the re-
gional circuit courts and the Federal Circuit. To find evidence of this, the
interested observer need look no further than the prior state of affairs in
regional circuit courts before the creation of the Federal Circuit. The Senate
Report recognized that patent law was an area "of the law in which the
appellate courts reach inconsistent decisions on the same issue, or in
which-although the rule of law may be fairly clear--courts apply the law
unevenly when faced with the facts of individual cases." 70 Similarly, the
House Report noted that
[e]ven in circumstances in which there is no conflict as to the actual rule
of law, the courts take such a great variety of approaches and attitudes
toward the patent system that the application of the law to the facts of an
individual case produces unevenness in the administration of the patent
law.
7 1
The state of patent law has not achieved such clarity in the last twenty-
three years that the same complications will not once again surface. It is not
until regional courts begin to apply their own law that litigators will be
induced to forum shop. The legislative history of the FCIA supports this
argument. 72 The Senate Report noted that, as uniformity to patent law de-
veloped, "the number of appeals resulting from attempts to obtain different
ruling on disputed legal points [could] be expected to decrease." 73 Like-
wise, a gradual increase in appeals can be expected as the uniformity in
patent law slowly erodes.
Second, the "fewer than ten cases" statistic applies only to counter-
claims, which constitute the cases now affected by Holmes; but not all of
the cases that have been withdrawn from Federal Circuit jurisdiction since
its inception arise as counterclaims. Also included within the original legis-
69. See Gentry Crook McLean, Vomado Hits the Midwest: Federal Circuit Jurisdiction in Patent
and Antitrust Cases After Holmes v. Vomado, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1091, 1119 (2004).
70. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 3.
71. H.R. REP.No. 97-312, at21 (1981).
72. See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5.
73. Id.
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lative intent are a wide variety of cases in which patent law forms a sub-
stantial part of a non-patent claim. Cases claiming antitrust, trademark,
copyright, trade secret, or contract violations may necessarily create a
compulsory counterclaim. 74 Thus, any potential patent infringer could pre-
emptively assert a non-frivolous claim under these non-patent fields to
secure jurisdiction in the regional circuit courts that end up developing case
law which is unfavorable to the patent owner.
75
Therefore, although the immediate effects on patent law, and hence
what Congress intended to protect with the FCIA, are limited, it is probable
that the number of cases brought before the regional circuit courts will
increase exponentially as the law develops in those courts. For this reason,
a response to these concerns is necessary to protect the uniformity of patent
law.
III. COURTS' RESPONSES TO HOLMES
Because the necessity for uniformity in patent law still remains and
the Holmes decision disrupts that uniformity, it is necessary to determine
the best response to alleviate the tension. The simplest response is to allow
the courts to individually enforce the congressional intent with respect to
patent law on a case by case basis. This Section examines possible re-
sponses of the courts affected by the Holmes decision and the likely effects
of each.
A. State and Trial Level Courts' Responses
After Holmes, cases in which the well-pleaded complaint does not
contain a patent law claim will be brought in either state trial courts or the
federal district courts. One of the primary benefits of Holmes is that these
trial level courts can easily look at the well-pleaded complaint to determine
jurisdiction over those claims and the law that the court should apply to the
given case.76 However, this benefit does not necessarily serve to create
uniformity in patent law as Congress intended in passing the FCIA.
Dealing with this anomaly at the state court level presents the greatest
problems. The tension created by the conflict between state and federal
power, which has guided the development of federal question jurisdiction,
is no less a concern with respect to the interpretation of patent law.
77
74. Cotropia, supra note 68, at 298.
75. Id
76. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 832 (2002).
77. H.R. REP. No.97-312, at 42 (1981).
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Moreover, this federalism concern was present when Congress passed the
FCIA and likely was a major reason why Congress required that Federal
Circuit jurisdiction follow federal question jurisprudence. 78 Because Con-
gress was initially willing to subordinate patent law's interest in uniformity
to federalism interests governed by federal question jurisdiction, this bal-
ance should not be disturbed.
That being said, it was common practice of state courts, prior to 1982,
to dismiss counterclaims that alleged patent issues, finding them to be
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. 79 From the perspec-
tive of state courts, the dismissal is judicially efficient because those claims
will not reappear in the state courts. However, it is unclear whether this is a
viable option in some states due to the compulsory nature of some counter-
claims. 80 If states do have a rule similar to Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, requiring counterclaims to suffer the same fate as the as-
sociated case, the demands of federalism and deference to Congress de-
mand that such patent claims remain in state courts. In these cases, the state
court should apply Federal Circuit law in an attempt to maintain uniform-
ity. As discussed below, however, such measures are likely to be ineffec-
tive. 81 Nonetheless, the number of cases containing patent counterclaims
that are neither removable to federal courts nor dismissible by the state
courts is likely to be quite small and should have a negligible effect on the
state of patent law.
With respect to federal district courts, the primary concern is which
law to apply to patent issues. The district court has the option to apply ei-
ther Federal Circuit law to all patent issues or to apply the law of the re-
gional circuit to which an appeal would be directed.82 This becomes
complicated when a patent issue is not a part of either the claim or counter-
claim, but constitutes a necessary component in deciding a non-patent is-
sue. The difficulty is that decisions in specific areas of law, including some
claims involving antitrust, contracts, copyrights, federal business law tort
claims such as trade dress infringement, patent licensing disputes, and state
78. Id. at 41.
79. See, e.g., W. Elec. Co. v. Components, Inc., 1970 WL 458, at *1 (Del. Ch. 1970); Pleatmaster,
Inc. v. Consol. Trimming Corp., 156 N.Y.S.2d 662, 662-63 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Superior Clay Corp. v.
Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n, 215 N.E.2d 437 (Ohio C.P. 1963).
80. Some states have a rule, similar to that of Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
wherein a counterclaim becomes compulsory if sufficiently related to claims in the complaint, thus
resulting in forfeiture of the claim upon dismissal. Ravi V. Sitwala, In Defense of Holmes v. Vornado:
Addressing the Unwarranted Criticism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 452, 476 (2004).
81. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
82. See Sitwala, supra note 80, at 476.
20061
CHICA GO-KENT LAW RE VIEW
law business disparagement claims, have a direct effect on patent law. 83 In
order to most effectively adhere to congressional intent, the district courts
should rely on Federal Circuit law for any of these issues that have a sub-
stantial effect on patent law.84 All of these causes of action existed at the
time Congress created the Federal Circuit. Thus, Congress's intent that
such causes should be adjudicated under Federal Circuit jurisdiction, as
indicated in both the House and Senate debates, 85 presents strong evidence
that the district courts should act to uphold this legislative determination.
B. Possible Response by the Federal Circuit
Despite the fact that the Holmes decision will reduce the number of
cases before the Federal Circuit, the court does not need to make significant
changes in its application of patent law in order to respect the congressional
intent to create certainty in the application of patent law. Although some
commentators have suggested that the Federal Circuit impermissibly
broadened its scope of jurisdiction by deciding substantial issues of non-
patent law, 86 it is necessary for the court to do so in some cases in order to
carry out its foundational mission to bring uniformity to patent law, as dis-
cussed above.
One specific argument made by Ravi Sitwala notes that there was
heavy debate in Congress before the creation of the court regarding the
potential for the Federal Circuit's "unchecked encroachment" on non-
patent areas of law. 87 Sitwala then proceeds to argue that this fear is being
realized, citing two Federal Circuit cases in which the court departed from
Ninth Circuit precedent regarding antitrust issues.88 While these types of
83. See, e.g., Telecomm Tech Servs., Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Commc'ns, Inc., 295 F.3d 1249 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (antitrust); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002)
(trade dress/trademark); DSC Commc'ns Corp v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(copyright); Leatherman Tool Group Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 131 F.3d 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (trade
dress).
84. This substantial questions test is addressed below to a limited extent. Although the operation
of a substantial questions test relating to patent law is beyond the scope of this Comment, I envision a
standard supported, guided, and implemented in a manner similar to the effects test utilized in the civil
procedure context of personal jurisdiction.
85. Congress intended that "[t]he court's jurisdiction will not be limited to one type of case, or
even to two or three types of cases. Rather, it will have a varied docket spanning a broad range of legal
issues and types of cases." S. REP. No. 97-275, at 6 (1981). Furthermore, there was extensive debate
concerning legislators' fears of manipulation of Federal Circuit jurisdiction to adjudicate non-patent law
issues; the passage of the Act, with the addition of protections against jurisdiction for cases in which
patent law was not a main issue, indicates that Congress intended the Federal Circuit to address these
causes. See Amy, supra note 16, at 450.
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decisions certainly have a substantial effect on non-patent law fields, Con-
gress acknowledged these concerns and found the importance of uniformity
in patent law held greater weight.89 In fact, in discussing the concern, Sit-
wala acknowledges that a committee "commissioned by Congress in 1972
to study the federal appellate system, studied many areas of the law, includ-
ing antitrust law, and found that forum shopping and lack of uniformity
problems were not on the same level in these areas as in patent law."90
Furthermore, the additional argument that the Federal Circuit will swallow
jurisdiction over antitrust law, thereby eliminating benefits from varying
decisions in different regional circuits, is unwarranted. 91 Not every case
involving antitrust law, or any other affected body of law, necessarily de-
pends on patent issues being a major part of the case. Those cases that do
not involve a significant patent issue, and thus have no substantial effect on
patent law, will remain with the circuit courts, leading any discrepancies in
interpretation of the law to surface.
Under the Holmes decision, however, those cases involving non-
patent law fields that substantially affect patent law will not reach the Fed-
eral Circuit because the complaint will specifically address the non-patent
law field. The Federal Circuit is therefore powerless to control the uniform-
ity of patent law with respect to its interrelation with other areas of law.:
C. Possible Responses by the Regional Circuit Courts
Because the Federal Circuit now lacks power to maintain uniformity
in patent law due to its loss of jurisdiction in all cases without a patent
claim in the plaintiff s complaint, the burden of maintaining uniformity will
fall largely on the regional circuit courts. As the federal district and state
courts are urged to follow Federal Circuit decisions not only in patent
counterclaims and defenses, but also in cases where non-patent claims nec-
essarily depend on patent issues, so too the regional circuit courts should
follow the lead of the Federal Circuit in order to maintain patent uniform-
ity. This outcome, however, is highly unlikely.
First, the regional circuit courts are not obligated to defer to the Fed-
eral Circuit because they are co-equal courts. 92 Although the judges in the
circuit courts are bound by oath to uphold the laws of the United States,
89. See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 6.
90. Sitwala, supra note 80, at 471 (citing Comm'n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys.,
Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 220 (1975)).
91. See id. at 472 (stating that very few cases "will be subject to forum shopping as a result of
Holmes").
92. Id. at 477.
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this does not include congressional intent, as evidenced by Justice Scalia's
opinion in Holmes when he reasoned, "Our task here is not to determine
what would further Congress's goal of ensuring patent-law uniformity, but
to determine what the words of the statute must fairly be understood to
mean." 93 Thus, the circuit courts are under no obligation to carry out the
requirements of the FCIA under the current interpretation of the Act.
At the outset, the circuit courts will almost certainly follow Federal
Circuit precedent on issues that clearly fall within the realm of patent law,
due primarily to the fact that there has been no development of that area of
law outside of the Federal Circuit since 1982. 94 However, as the courts
become more comfortable with the subject matter, it is highly unlikely that
comity concerns will restrain the courts from developing their own case
law, especially in light of the Federal Circuit's history of straying from
regional circuit court interpretation of non-patent issues. 95 Additionally, the
circuit courts have a well established body of law in non-patent fields, and
stare decisis will typically cause these courts to follow that precedent re-
gardless of whether patent law substantially affects the outcome of those
claims. 96
However, this hypothesizing is irrelevant in the end. Even if the circuit
courts did follow Federal Circuit precedent with respect to patent law in all
the ways contemplated by Congress in the FCIA, the uniformity of patent
law would still slowly decay. This is due to the fact that interpretations of
existing precedent are always prone to differing opinions. While it is true
that these differing opinions may exist within the Federal Circuit itself, that
court is bound to its own prior opinion not only by stare decisis, but also by
its foundational requirement of creating uniformity in the field of patent
law. For these reasons, the uniformity sought by Congress is most likely to
develop exclusively through the Federal Circuit.
D. Appellate Review by the Supreme Court
Although the judicial system could conceivably achieve uniformity by
appeal to the Supreme Court, this solution is unrealistic from a practical
standpoint. The problem arises from the infrequency with which the Su-
93. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 833 (2002).
94. McLean, supra note 69, at 1118.
95. See, e.g., Nobelpharma v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067-68 (1998).
96. See Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift on a Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in Patent
Law Post-Vomado Through Deference to the Federal Circuit, 92 GEO. L.J. 523, 595 (2003).
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preme Court reviews disputed patent issues. 97 The administrative limita-
tions of the Supreme Court Justices make it impossible to respond to the
multitude of conflicts that arise in the ever-expanding legal community.98
With the number of cases filed each year at the trial level continually in-
creasing, the number of conflicts deserving of review at the highest level
will invariably increase. 99 However, with the Supreme Court already at or
near full capacity, many of these cases will fall by the wayside. 100 The
Supreme Court's history in granting certiorari indicates that the majority of
cases heard by the Court will involve constitutional conflicts. 101 This
leaves only a minimal number of opportunities for the Court to hear issues
regarding lengthy and complicated patent appeals, which further reduces
the number of non-constitutional cases that the Court may hear. For these
reasons, latent conflicts would likely remain festering in the different re-
gional courts for long periods of time, effectively stifling investment in
innovation and impeding national economic prosperity.
E. Inability of the Judicial System to Follow the CIA in Light of Holmes
Even in the unlikely event that the regional appellate courts decide to
follow Federal Circuit law regarding all patent issues, including those in
patent-affecting areas of law, patent law uniformity will still be slowly
eroded. As with any fuzzy area of the law, courts interpreting precedent
often tend to reach different conclusions. Thus, even a good faith effort on
the part of the judicial system as a whole to uphold congressional intent is
unlikely to succeed. For these reasons, it is the responsibility of Congress
to reassert the goal of uniformity in such a way as to ensure that the judicial
system carries out its intent under the FCIA.
IV. A CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO HOLMES
This much is clear: The current jurisdictional power granted to the
Federal Circuit by Congress is insufficient to execute the intent behind its
creation. The well-pleaded complaint rule, which the Supreme Court held
97. Elizabeth I. Rogers, The Phoenix Precedents: The Unexpected Rebirth of Regional Circuit
Jurisdiction over Patent Appeals and the Need for a Considered Congressional Response, 16 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 411,420 (2003).
98. Fed. Judicial Ctr., Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D.
573,578-81(1972).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 580 (noting that the ratio of Supreme Court's number of grants of certiorari to the num-
ber of applications has dramatically decreased each decade with a high of 17.5 percent in 1941 to 5.8
percent in 1971).
101 See Hruska Report, supra note 26, at 211-22.
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governs Federal Circuit jurisdiction, is a bright line rule developed to de-
termine matters of federal question jurisdiction. 102 The Federal Circuit
decision in Aerojet asserted jurisdiction based on the "substantial question"
of the effect of an antitrust law on patent law. 103 This reasoning is in accord
with the "substantial question" test articulated, but not applied, in the
Holmes decision.
But what constitutes a "substantial question" of patent law? The Fed-
eral Circuit began to define the scope of this test in Nobelpharma, Aerojet,
and subsequent cases, but the Holmes decision divested the court of this
power prior to a comprehensive development of the rule. 104 One problem is
that the policy reasons behind the well-pleaded complaint rule are substan-
tially different than those behind patent policy, and therefore the well-
pleaded complaint rule is not well suited to the standard-based field of pat-
ent law. Congress needs to create jurisdiction broad enough to allow the
Federal Circuit to provide some guidance to both practitioners who are
currently unaware of what law will be applied to matters involving this
gray area of patent law and to district courts, which are faced with prob-
lems in choosing which law to apply as a result of indefiniteness. 105
In order to understand why differing treatment of patent law jurisdic-
tion and federal question jurisdiction is necessary, from a procedural stand-
point, it is important to first address how patent law differs from federal
question jurisdiction. In enacting the FCIA, Congress specifically shaped
the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit to operate in the same manner as
federal question jurisdiction. 106 At first glance, the relationship and similar
treatment of these two doctrines seem appropriate. After all, both doctrines
address jurisdiction based on a specific issue rather than geography; both
use the "arising under" language to define the scope of jurisdiction; and
both are intended to exclude cases in which the specific subject matter need
not be addressed in order to decide the case. 107 However, despite these
similarities, the fundamental purposes of federal question jurisdiction and
Federal Circuit jurisdiction are quite distinct from each other. Federal ques-
102. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983)
("[W]hether a case is one arising under the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States, in the
sense of the jurisdictional statute .... must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plain-
tiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of
avoidance of defenses.") (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914)).
103. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, 895 F.2d 736, 741 (1990).
104. See Nobelpharma v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067-68; see also Aerojet, 895
F.2d at 741-45.
105. See Bass & Alcorn, supra note 2, at 519.
106. McLean, supra note 69, at 1106.
107. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8-9.
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tion jurisdiction developed primarily in response to federalism concerns. 108
Merrell Dow, a seminal Supreme Court case defining federal question ju-
risdiction as it stands today, dictates that
"the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not
automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction." Instead, "sensitive
judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal
system" are necessary to determine whether granting a federal forum is
consistent with the "need for prudence and restraint in the jurisdictional
inquiry." 109
Thus, despite the name, the primary focus of federal question jurisdic-
tion is federal power, not the federal substantive issues; those issues are
only the subject matter by which the federalism interests are addressed. In
contrast, Congress created the Federal Circuit to address specific issues of
an inherently federal nature.
It is true that the differences in the fundamental purpose behind fed-
eral question and Federal Circuit jurisdiction existed at the time Congress
created the Federal Circuit and that Congress nonetheless defined the
court's jurisdiction with respect to federal question jurisdiction." l0 How-
ever, the state of federal question jurisdiction at the time of the FCIA dif-
fered dramatically from its current interpretation.111 The structure of
federal question jurisdiction in 1982 presented Congress with a convenient
way to avoid potential federalism issues and, at the same time, to ensure
that any significant patent issues that developed in a case, either in whole
or in part, would find their way into the Federal Circuit.1 12 Unfortunately,
due to the development of the well-pleaded complaint rule, the federal
question foundation upon which Federal Circuit jurisdiction depends is
now an inappropriate mechanism for achieving the underlying purpose
behind the creation of the court.
The reason that Congress did not initially account for these policy dif-
ferences in passing the FCIA is clear when viewed from an historical per-
spective. Prior to Supreme Court's decision in Franchise Tax Board v.
108. See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809-10 (1986).
109. The Supreme Court: 1985 Term-Leading Cases: Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 100
HARv. L. REv. 230, 232 (1986) (quoting Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 809-13)).
110. See McLean, supra note 69, at 1106.
111. See infra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
112. This is due primarily to the fact that in 1982, federal question jurisdiction had not developed to
the point that counterclaims did not constitute a basis for appeal. Instead, the courts determined only
whether a substantive federal issue existed in the case and allowed removal accordingly. Federal ques-
tion jurisdiction always acted as a protection against federalism concerns, a feature that Congress
intended to take advantage of. See also Amy, supra note 16, at 454 n.169 (listing examples of arising
under analysis from the 19th century). This Comment does not address the wisdom of federal question
jurisdiction either before or after the advent of the well-pleaded complaint rule; the point is addressed
only to illustrate the jurisdiction that Congress intended for the Federal Circuit in creating the court.
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Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California,113 the test
for federal question jurisdiction dictated that "a case may arise under fed-
eral law 'where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned
on some construction of federal law." ' 114 It wasn't until 1983 that the
Franchise Tax decision, according to the Merrell Dow Court, imposed
additional limitations on this test.1 15
However, Congress enacted the FCIA in 1982, prior to the limiting
developments regarding federal question jurisdiction. 116 At that time, Con-
gress defined the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit based, "in whole or in
part," on the jurisdiction of the federal district courts under § 1338's arising
under language.' 17 In the House Committee Report for the FCIA, Congress
dictated that this jurisdiction exists "in the same sense that cases are said to
'arise under' federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction." 118
The well-pleaded complaint rule governs which cases arise under federal
law for the purposes of federal question jurisdiction. 119 However, the un-
derstanding and application of that rule in 1982, when Congress passed the
Act, differed dramatically from the well-pleaded complaint rule's current
interpretation. 1
20
The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress intended a
far broader scope of jurisdiction for the Federal Circuit than exists under
the well-pleaded complaint rule today. 121 Of utmost importance is the fact
that in 1982, counterclaims were not necessarily excluded from federal
question jurisdiction. 122 The legislative history clearly indicates that this
was Congress's understanding of federal question jurisdiction. For exam-
ple, in discussing the limits on the Federal Circuit's jurisdictional scope,
the Senate Report notes that federal district courts are encouraged to use
their authority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to separate final
decisions of non-patent claims from "trivial patent claims, counterclaims,
cross-claims, or third party claims raised to manipulate jurisdiction."' 23
This language makes it evident that non-trivial counterclaims, cross-claims,
113. 463 U.S. at 1 (1983).
114. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808, 809 & n.5 (citing Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255
U.S. 180 (1921) as the case most frequently cited for this proposition).
115. Id.
116. See Fox, supra note 7, at 343.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000).
118. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at41 (1981).
119. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808.
120. See Fox, supra note 7, at 343.
121. See Fed. Circuit Bar Ass'n Bd. of Governors, supra note 3, at 713-14.
122. See Amy, supra note 16, at 452; Fox, supra note 7, at 345 & n.86.
123. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 20 (1981).
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or third party claims, legitimately raised, should not be separated, but in-
stead should be appealable to the Federal Circuit. This is further supported
in Appendix B of the Senate Report, which gives an example in which a
patent counterclaim is filed in response to an antitrust allegation and ulti-
mately appealed to the Federal Circuit. 124 The subsequent narrowing of
federal question jurisdiction effectively narrows the scope of Federal Cir-
cuit jurisdiction, contrary to the intent of Congress.
Unlike federal question jurisdiction, Congress intended the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Circuit to depend on specific issues that it deemed to
require special treatment. 125 Cases that affect these issues "in whole or in
part" were thus intended to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Circuit. 126 While federalism concerns still constitute a factor to be
considered under this determination, 127 this factor is not the fundamental
purpose upon which jurisdiction is based, making it substantially different
than federal question jurisdiction. This is demonstrated most notably in that
the issue of federal question jurisdiction arises only when a case involves
state causes of action. However, Federal Circuit jurisdiction issues occur
predominantly in deciding which federal appellate court is appropriate for
applying federal law. 128 Thus, in the vast majority of cases, federalism
problems do not even arise in determining whether the Federal Circuit has
appropriate jurisdiction.
Because Congress did not intend for patent law to be governed in the
manner that federal question jurisdiction is governed today,129 clarification
that reflects the policy concerns underlying patent law rather than federal
questions must be made to ensure efficient application of the law in this
field. Because the desire to promote and encourage innovation that led
Congress to enact the FCIA still exists, and because the Act's interpretation
that provided the means for achieving that end has changed so as to limit
the ability of the judicial system to effect it, Congress must act to protect
this goal. To do so, it is necessary to redefine the jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit in order to avoid an interpretation that vitiates the goal. The intel-
124. Id. app. B at 38.
125. Note that this does not mean that Congress intended the Federal Circuit to have issue jurisdic-
tion. On the contrary, Congress intended to grant the court broad non-patent jurisdiction. See generally
Fed. Circuit Bar Ass'n Bd. of Governors, supra note 3, at 716-23.
126. See id. at 714-15.
127. Federalism is not addressed in any jurisdictional statute related to the Federal Circuit. Instead,
Congress sought to protect federalism concerns by relying on prior judicially created protections under
federal question jurisdiction. See generally McLean, supra note 69, at 1105-06.
128. Id. at 1117.
129. Fed. Circuit Bar Ass'n Bd. of Governors, supra note 3, at 713-14.
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lectual community has proposed several ways in which Congress could
respond.
For example, one commentator suggests amending both § 1295(a)(1)
and § 1338(a) "in order to ensure exclusive Federal Circuit jurisdiction
over patent law counterclaims after Holmes."'130 The proposed amendment
to § 1295(a)(1) would remove the Federal Circuit's dependence on
§ 1338(a), which defines the district court's jurisdiction, and replaces it
with jurisdiction based on "a final decision of a district court of the United
States... if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on
any claim or counterclaim under any Act of Congress relating to pat-
ents .... ,,131 This revision would ensure that all counterclaims involving
patent law would come within the scope of Federal Circuit jurisdiction. The
proposal further amends § 1338(a) to ensure that all non-frivolous patent
claims and counterclaims are brought within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the district courts, thus ensuring that the Federal Circuit has access to all
such claims through the amended § 1295(a)(1). 132
This proposal contains at least two significant deficiencies. First, the
proposed statutory amendment to § 1295(a)(1) is designed exclusively to
restore Federal Circuit jurisdiction over counterclaims. 133 However, it gives
no consideration to patent issues that are not claimed, but that are necessary
elements of the claims or counterclaims. Such elements of a case have the
same capacity to disrupt the uniformity of patent law as do patent claims
and counterclaims. Thus, although this proposal would reverse the effect of
Holmes on Federal Circuit jurisdiction, it does not fully address the diver-
gence of this jurisdiction from the intent of Congress. Second, the amended
§ 1338(a) is equally insufficient in implementing the full intent of Con-
gress. The current form of § 1338 is based on "arising under" jurisdiction,
which the courts assess on the basis of federal question jurisdiction prece-
dent. 134 The proposed § 1338 confers jurisdiction to the district courts,
"based on a claim or counterclaim for relief under any Act of Congress
relating to patents .... -"135 The only qualification is that claims may not be
frivolous. 136 Again, this standard fails to address all of the ways in which
patent law may be affected.
130. See Amy, supra note 16, at 456.
131. Id. at 456-57 (emphasis in original).
132. Id. at 457.
133. See generally id.
134. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829-30 (2002).
135. See Amy, supra note 16, at 457 (emphasis in original).
136. Id.
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Consider these amended statutes as applied to Christianson v. Colt.13 7
In that case, Colt sued under trade secret and antitrust claims. 138
Christianson, the defendant, argued that the patents upon which the actions
were based were invalid. 139 The Supreme Court noted that jurisdiction
under § 1338 exists if "patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-
pleaded claims."' 140 Yet the "based on" language of the proposed § 1338 is
ambiguous at best as to whether such claims would be covered. A literal
reading of the proposed amendment would seem to indicate that patent law
must form the basis of the claim, rather than a necessary component
thereof. For this reason, the amendment is insufficient with respect to re-
storing the congressionally intended scope of Federal Circuit jurisdiction.
An alternative amendment is suggested by the Federal Circuit Bar As-
sociation (FCBA). 141 The FCBA suggests that, because the jurisdiction of
the Federal Circuit governed by § 1295(a) directs appeals by reference to
§ 1338, only an amendment to the derivative statute is necessary. 142 The
proposed amendment to § 1338 reads, "The district courts shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction of any civil action involving any claim for relief arising
under any Act of Congress relating to patents .... ,,143 The FCBA argues
that the addition of "involving any claim for relief' will ensure that all
patent appeals will be directed to the Federal Circuit. 144
The simple, straightforward amendment of only § 1338 is a reasonable
and efficient proposal. It minimizes the amount of effort, discussion, and
time that such congressional amendments will entail. However, the lan-
guage used in the proposed amendment only sets the stage for a new
Holmes decision. The Holmes Court, as mentioned above, strictly inter-
preted the "arising under" language of the current § 1338 to depend upon
the well pleaded complaint rule due to the necessity for "linguistic consis-
tency."'145 Because the same language remains in the proposed § 1338, it is
difficult to conclude that the Supreme Court would revisit its prior holding.
137. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
138. Id. at805-06.
139. Id. at 806. Although the Supreme Court eventually determined that the Federal Circuit did not
have jurisdiction in the case, the opinion clearly indicates that it would have had jurisdiction if the
plaintiffs claims were solely dependent on this issue.
140. Id. at 809.




145. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830-34 (2002) ("It
would be an unprecedented feat of interpretive necromancy to say that § 1338(a)'s 'arising under'
language means one thing (the well-pleaded-complaint rule) in its own right, but something quite
different (respondent's complaint-or-counterclaim rule) when referred to by § 1295(a)(1).").
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Once the court determines that jurisdiction arises pursuant to the well
pleaded complaint rule, the additional language of the proposed claim is
rendered meaningless with respect to counterclaims, cross-claims, and third
party claims. This is because the modem well pleaded complaint rule con-
siders only those claims that arise from the plaintiff's well pleaded com-
plaint.146 Despite the fact that "claim for relief," which under federal law
includes counterclaims, cross-claims, and third party claims, attempts to
broaden the scope of Federal Circuit jurisdiction, the Supreme Court in
Holmes made it abundantly clear that the "arising under" language is con-
trolling. 147 Thus, the proposed legislation fails to overcome a major obsta-
cle in enacting the original legislative intent.
Only recently, the House of Representatives itself responded to the
problems addressed in this Comment by proposing a bill entitled the "Intel-
lectual Property Jurisdiction Clarification Act of 2005. '' 148 As of the time
this Comment was written, no explanation or reasoning exists in the public
record to indicate how the drafters of the amendment intended the language
to affect the jurisdiction, so reliance on the plain language is necessary to
determine its potential effects. Instead of revising § 1338(a) to achieve
broader jurisdiction for the Federal Circuit, the proposal amends
§ 1295(a)(1), which no longer depends on § 1338(a). The proposed amend-
ment to § 1295(a) reads:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have ex-
clusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final decision of a district court
of the United States... in any civil action in which a party has asserted a
claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents or
plant variety protection. 149
Although the proposed amendment revises § 1295 rather than § 1338,
the solution mirrors the suggested proposal of the FCBA by explicitly stat-
ing that jurisdiction depends on any asserted claim of relief relating to pat-
ents, as opposed to depending on the rules applicable to civil actions
146. Id. at 834.
147. Id. at 830-1. In fact, the respondent argued that the Court should interpret the "arising under"
language differently with respect to Federal Circuit jurisdiction. Justice Scalia, however, did not think
this was an available option for the Court. Id. at 833. The problem is that the "arising under" language
is very strongly tied to the judicially created federal question jurisdiction. Federal question jurisdiction,
in turn, is tied to the policy that the federal courts must give "due regard for the rightful independence
of state governments." Id. at 832. Very few policies will carry sufficient weight to overcome this feder-
alism concern. Therefore, any amendment to Federal Circuit jurisdiction must be untied from federal
question jurisdiction to the extent that federalism concerns are not at issue.
148. Intellectual Property Jurisdiction Clarification Act of 2005, H.R. 2955 IH, 109th Cong. § 3
(2005), at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c 109:1 :./temp/-c1097aCNhg::.
149. Id.
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generally. 150 The proposal further adds that a party asserts the patent re-
lated claim for relief, indicating that the plaintiff is not the only party that
can cause the Federal Circuit to obtain jurisdiction.151
Despite this addition, the proposal, as a whole, suffers from the same
deficiency as the FCBA proposal. By retaining the arising under language,
the proposal fails to evade the well-pleaded complaint rule. The Supreme
Court in Holmes unanimously established that the arising under language
must be interpreted identically for the purposes of both § 1338 and federal
question jurisdiction. 152 In fact, the Court specifically addressed the hypo-
thetical use of the term in § 1295(a)(1), stating,
It would be difficult enough to give "arising under" the meaning urged
by respondent if that phrase appeared in § 1295(a)(1)-the jurisdiction-
conferring statute-itself Even then the phrase would not be some ne-
ologism that might justify our adverting to the general purpose of the
legislation, but rather a term familiar to all law students as invoking the
well-pleaded-complaint rule.153
Thus, it appears that in order to use the "arising under" language with-
out importing federal question jurisprudence, it would be necessary for
Congress to explicitly disclaim the use of that law for the court to disregard
the well-pleaded complaint rule. The language of the proposal, however,
has no such explicit disclaimer.
It is therefore likely that the court would interpret the text of the pro-
posed amendment to support the "arising under" language. Under such an
interpretation, "any civil action in which a party has asserted a claim for
relief' would refer to any civil action in which a plaintiff has asserted a
claim in the complaint. This is the only possible interpretation that is con-
sistent with Holmes and other prior federal question jurisprudence. Fur-
thermore, it would be irrelevant that Congress enacted the bill with the
intent of altering Federal Circuit jurisdiction because, as the Court stated in
Holmes, its "task is not to determine what would further Congress's goal of
ensuring patent-law uniformity, but to determine what the words of the
statute must fairly be understood to mean." For this reason, the current
congressional proposal is insufficient.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 833-34. There is no doubt that the Supreme Court would make the same
argument with respect to the "arising under" language of the proposed amendment to § 1295.
153. Id. at 833 (citation omitted) (emphasis in the original). The Court went on to address the use of
the arising under language in Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., stating
that "[t]he use of the phrase 'cases and controversies arising under' . . . is strong evidence that Congress
intended to borrow the body of decisional law that has developed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and other
grants of jurisdiction to the district courts over cases 'arising under' various regulatory statutes." Id.
(citing 604 F.2d 179, 183 (2d Cir. 1979)).
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In addition to clarifying the jurisdictional boundaries of the Federal
Circuit with respect to claims and counterclaims, Congress must create a
standard for those cases substantially affecting patent law that gives exclu-
sive jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit. Needless to say, this standard must
be wholly independent of the well-pleaded complaint rule, reflecting in-
stead the policies of patent law as opposed to federal questions.
To accomplish this goal, it is unnecessary to amend § 1295(a), which
directs appeals from the district court based "in whole or in part" on § 1338
to the Federal Circuit.154 Instead, Congress should amend § 1338, which is
founded upon the "arising under" language that triggers application of the
well pleaded complaint rule. 155 The amendment should read as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action un-
der which a party's right to relief necessarily depends upon an Act of
Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states
in patent, plant variety and copyright cases.
This legislation has several substantial benefits. First and foremost, the
amendment unties the jurisdiction of the district court from the well-
pleaded complaint rule for patent claims by eliminating the "arising under"
language originally contained in the statute. This allows Congress to con-
trol which patent cases are appealed to the Federal Circuit without concern
for the evolution of any judicially created doctrine. Second, the use of the
word "party" clearly indicates to the court that a plaintiff, defendant, or
third party may assert a claim for relief that requires appeal to the Federal
Circuit, thus enabling all cases directly affecting patent law to the uniform
application of Federal Circuit law. Third, the inclusion of "right to relief'
further signifies that jurisdiction is not exclusively based on the plaintiff's
complaint, but can be based on a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third
party claim. Finally, the requirement that relief must necessarily depend on
a congressional act relating to patent law provides an element of certainty
for the parties and the district courts. From the time the complaint and an-
swers are filed, the parties and courts will know if a patent question is at
issue and which court has appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, the question of
which law to apply will be clear.
CONCLUSION
Congress created the Federal Circuit, in part, to create uniformity in
the field of patent law. The statutory language made the court's jurisdiction
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
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dependent on federal question jurisdiction and the well pleaded complaint
rule. The development of that rule subsequent to passage of the Federal
Courts Improvement Act has gradually cast doubt on the effectiveness of
the Act. The Supreme Court finally confirmed the inherent statutory limita-
tion on Federal Circuit jurisdiction with its decision in Holmes.
This decision severely limits the ability of the Federal Circuit to create
uniformity in patent law, as its enabling Act requires. From the decision
follows uncertainty in business planning, decreased investment due to the
heightened risk, and a general burden to national economic growth. The
concerns that existed prior to the inception of the Federal Circuit are once
again present. Ultimately, only a congressional response that separates
Federal Circuit jurisdiction from federal question jurisdiction can restore
the benefits reaped from twenty years of Federal Circuit jurisprudence.

